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1The aviation industry is a critical element of any tourism system, and has several secondary effects - a source
of employment and foreign exchange earnings amongst them. A 'national carrier' is also a symbol of the
country, a source of pride amongst the local community and a representative of the host country in other
countries that it flies to.
It is important to investigate whether the airline industry is, by and large, acting in an ethical and socially
responsible manner. Or is it that, given the current wave of liberalization, airlines are only acting in their own
self-interest and answerable only to their shareholder base. Solomon (1993) points out that most people are
aware of ethical issues and the micro- or macro-level, but ethical issues at what he terms the 'molar' level
(whose unit is the modem corporate organisation) are unclear, especially when they interact with micro- and
. . -- . .
macro-issues. In other words, whilst what constitutes ethical behaviour by business units is open to debate, the
issue of the corporation's social obligations to the community are even more rarely discussed. One particular
set of possibly unethical behaviours is the nature of anti-competitive and collusive business practices. This
paper uses some ethics-based approaches to examine three particular aviation industry issues that fall within
this domain.
Whilst there are a multitude of issues relating to actual or alleged unethical and/or socially irresponsible
behaviours amongst airlines, this paper will focus on a few aspects only. Specifically, only the passenger
product-market of airlines will be considered, and the discussion will also focus on the collaborative efforts
between individual airlines, on the one hand, and between airiines and airports on the other. It will, however,
cover both domestic and international airiines, both full-service and low-cost.. . ..•
An Ethics-based Approach
Most writings on the aviation industry have been based on approaches that incorporate an economics or
management perspective. Whilst this could be considered appropriate given the applied nature of much of the
research, they have tended to ignore broader ethical issues and/or issues of social responsibility. Tribe (2006)
opines that this hinders 'perception and knowledge-creation'; he quotes Sayer in saying that such discipline-
based analyses "tend to be incapable of seeing beyond the questions posed by their own discipline, which
provide an all-purpose filter for everything" (1999:2) and is 'a recipe for misunderstanding the social world'
(1999:1).
2Macbeth (2005) agrees with this view and argues for a' value-full-science' (2005: 973) rather than one that fails
to use a base of values - what the author terms a 'value-free science'. Even within the field of tourism
sustainability, research has been dominated by the objectivity inherent in a positivist approach. He traces the
development of tourism scholarship as outlined by Jafari (cited in Macbeth, 2005) as it moved through the
following approaches:
a. Firstly, an advocacy platform in the fifties and sixties as personal mobility and the affordability of
tourism increased, and destinations discover the economic benefits that accrue,
b. Secondly, a cautionary approach when negative impacts on physical and cultural environments and
economic disbenefits were becoming evident at local sites,
c. Then an adaptancy platform emerged in the 1980s that focused on approaches that minimize such
impacts without inhibiting the tourism growth that was, by now, becoming ubiquitous.
d. This has led to a knowledge-based platform that would serve the reality of a now-globalised tourism
industry; this approach tended to generate objectively-derived knowledge to serve primarily positive
economic outcomes.
e. The current approach is a platform based on Sustainable Development (SD) that looks to the long-term
sustainability of a destination as a whole through planning and policy frameworks that generate
standards, laws and codes of conduct addressing environmental protection, cultural hernage
preservation, and wide dispersal of economic benefit amongst the population. Such a platform
recognises both the necessity of community participation, as well as the economic imperatives of
tourism suppliers from private industry.
Macbeth (2005) cautions against accepting the SD platform as the preferred or most holis~c of the platforms.
The SD platform is, he says,
"is anthropocentric and inherently conflictual, with consensus unlikely. The paradigm involves power
and inequality, is political, and lends itself to slogan misuse." (2005:968)
He points out that much of the SD platform pushes a neo-liberal-cum-green agenda which does disadvantage
some smaller, less powerful local communities. He argues for a sixth platform of study arguing that future
action be studied within an ethical framework.
3"Arguably, recognizing indigenous practices while resisting the urge to dominate goes some way
toward understanding the praxis of a neotenous alternative. This position puts in relief the conflict
between the crises of environment and social justice." (2005: 971)
It can also be seen that the above-mentioned platforms have evolved in response to the growth of tourism from
small-scale to mass tourism, from being localized to becoming a global industry, as well as reflecting the
tourists' relentless search for the new, the authentic, and the unspoilt. In other words, the disciplinary
approaches have been reactive. However, many writers argue that the proposed sixth platform will need to be
more proactive, rather than reactive (Dwyer, 2005, Macbeth, 2005).
Whilst the above writings have centered on sustainable ..development in small or relatively powerless ecanomies
in remote or rural areas, it is time to explore other more developed sectors and facets of tourism and the
tourism industry. Much of the responsibility for the negative impacts on natural environments, valuable cultural
assets and traditional communities' way of life has been sheeted home to the private sector. In a sense, there is
an unstated proposition that industrial (including tourism) development has been responsible for the erosion or
destruction of the home of the 'pasf - the natural environment of a few decades ago, the heritage and way of
life of perhaps even the pre-industrial age. There has been only limited research on, specifically, the tourism
industry's practices' impact on people's currenfway of life, socio-economic welfare and aspirations, particularly
in the developed countries (Souty, 2005). Some industrial practices may be legally compliant, and indeed may
be taught at business schools and industrial training as being desirable strategies. The emphasis on
achievement-orientation, the frequent references to The Art of Warand Porter's 5 forces influencing generic
competitive strategies (Souty, 2005) in discussing competitive strategies are cases in point Such norms'(et
both the individual and corporate leveQare indeed the logical corollary of a liberal marKet-oriented system.
If one accepts the premise that for tourism to grow and be sustainable the continued involvement of the
organized private sector is essential, then we academics and researchers should examine the impacts of all
their practices, especially those that may be gratifying to the individual employee, shareholder, organisation,
and/or consumer (in generating consumer surplus).These practices and industry-wide norms might, in so
doing, disadvantage some host communities, and here the community comprises the middle-class, urbanized
individual, who might well be tomorrow's employee or tomorrow's tourist. Some business practices and anti-
competitive behaviour may also disbenefitthe economic and social well-being of such 'developed' and, often
quite powerful, communities. Souty (2005) lists some of these practices - "cartels, abuses of a dominant
4position, abuse of buying power and/or attempts to monopolize, and more rarely, anti-competitive mergers and
acquisitions" (p.3).
This paper focuses on some business practices of the airline industry. Airlines are employers of a large number
of individuals, either directly or indirectly. At some selected points in their network (for example the home-base,
and their 'hubs' if any), their employment runs into thousands. If one then adds the employment generated by
airports, the economic and concomitant social impact becomes substantial.
Fleckenstein and Huebsch (1999) attempted to "formulate rules to differentiate between good and bad" (p.137),
for a tourism world that operates within a paradigm of "profit-clriven mega-businesses" (po197). Whilst such
rules have been attempted in the context of sustainable tourism, there are other flanks in the field of tourism
that may be undertaking actions that indicate a lack of ethics or social responsibility. This paper will take 'a step
towards the formation of such rules in the aviation sphere.
Tribe (2002) and Jamal (2004) use Aristotle's concept of telos to underpin their discussion oftourism ethics.
Both authors say that it is not enough to make the 'righf decisions or actions; such 'righf decisions are usually
considered so only from a particular disciplinary or even ideological perspective. Rather the question should be
of ends - what will this action achieve. What intrinsic and extrinsic virtues does a particular problem or issue in
tourism fulfill? Jamal (2004) identifies several situations where 'profitability is important but not at any cost'
(p.534). Successful enterprise would lead to the development and economic well-being of a destination, in
some measure, but there may be a cost at the macro social level, or even at the micro (regional destination or
attraction) level. Hence knowledge and skills in disciplinary and practical aspects need to be complemented by. .
an ethical perspective.
One might understand the term telos to signify a set of principles that signify a greater purpose which in tum
directs activities and decisions. It may therefore be appropriate to attempt to develop such purpose-statements
for tourism as a whole, and/or for significant sectors or aspects of it To complement Jamal's discussion
(2004)of the 'dimensions' of telos in hotels, sustainable tourism and ecotourism, this paper proposes some
principles for the aviation industry, which might be construed as constituting such a te/os. It does so after a
discussion of some recent and contentious situations that have arisen within the aviation industry. This paper
also defines the direct 'beneficiaries' of such principles as comprising the six sets of stakeholders identified by
the Caux Round Table (Grace and Cohen, 1998), viz. customers, employees, owners, suppliers, competitors
and communities.
5Discussion
Airlines collaborate with many firms. As indicated earlier, such collaboration could result in anti-competitive
behaviour that might not be in the public interest. Three particular sets of collaborative linkages are discussed
below in this paper in an attempt to incorporate ethics-based perspectives into the maintenance of these
linkages. The aim of the discussion is to suggest underlying principles that might guide airlines to satisfy their
own economic and growth objectives without ignoring the broader effect of their actions and strategies on other
stakeholders and the tourism industry in particular. The three sets of linkages are
1. Between airlines and airports,
2. Between governments in their negotiations leading to Bilateral Ar.service agreements, and
3. Between two or more airlines in bilateral or multi-lateral alliances.
Even though the second linkage is not strictly between airlines, they are indeed the main beneficiaries, they are
the ones who operationalise the capacities, routes and frequencies negotiated in these agreements. More
importantly, airlines make submissions to their respective governments as flag-carriers and very actively lobby
the govern ments to secure outcomes that are beneficial to their objectives and strategies. Each of these
linkages is discussed in some depth below.
1.Airline-Airport Relationships: In the past, both these industry sectors were regarded as essential
infrastructure and both were owned and operated {albeit sometimes as corporatised agencies} by national
governments. Public policy the world over has since drawn from the experience of the liberalized aviation
environment in the USA, and has accepted its macro-economic rationale. Govemment-owned airlines were
thus the first to be sold off to private enterprise, though most of them retained f1ag-carrier status, and have
restrictions on the percentage of shareholding allowed to be held by foreigners. Now, the focus has shifted to
airport privatization - again with restrictions on foreign ownership, but many of the newly privatized airports
have significan~ albeit minority, foreign shareholders. Increasingly such shareholders are foreign-owned airport
management companies like the British Airports Authority, Macquarie Airports, Civil Aviation Authority of
Singapore, Aeroports de Paris and The Schiphol Group. Dum, Adler and Yu {2006} found that airport
6privatization does produce higher profitability and productivity. But is such profitability in the interest of all
stakeholders? Does a privatized airport leave a community (employees, suppliers and the local community)
dangerously exposed to business cycles? Where does that leave small island communities, or countries with
only one international air gateway? Far-fetched as it might be, the question may be posed of the airport in
Perth, Western Australia - the capital of a mineral-rich state of 2 million people, and its nearest alternative
equivalent airports are 2000 kilometres away. An airport closure could isolate it even from the rest of Australia.
Leaving aside the question of airport privatization, and focusing on the commercial elements of the airline-
airport relationship, it must be the airline is but one customer of an airport (Albers Koch and Ruff, 2005). This
relationship clearly has to be mutually beneficial. It is self-evident that neither party can exist without the
presence, active involvement, and effective operations of the other - in other words, this is a symbiotic
relationship. Albers et aI, (2005) illustrate this relationship using a value chain analysis of an airline identifying
the different elements of airport services that impact on"the airline product Four particular aspects of this
relationship are now discussed,
a.. Airports may negotiate what appear to be preferential deals with individual airlines, shutting out competition
to similar terms. The deal between Ryanair and Charleroi airport in Belgium was struck down by the EC on just
these grounds (Barrett, 2004, Gillen et al.,2005). Gillen et al (2005) detail the terms of the agreement - Ryanair
got vastly reduced landing charges and ground handling fees, as well as contributions to accommodation costs,
advertising and even pilot training. In return they committed to base a certain number of aircraft and operate a
certain number of flights from Charleroi.
The European Union recognised the airport's right to enter into such an agreement, but criticized its lack of
. .
transparency and its 15-year duration, terms which were not allegedly available to competitors like Virgin
Express, They also ruled that it constituted 'illegal state aid' to an airline, as the airport was owned by the local
government The EU Commission was attempting to be consistent here, as it had previously ruled against state
aid to legacy flag carriers like Air France and Alitalia. But there is an issue here in that this was a 'new' set of
operations being started up utilising an under-utilised resource (an ex-military airfield). Had it not been for
Ryanair's approach, would there have been a viable airport operation at Charleroi (with all its attendant
economic benefits to the region)? Would tourist to and from the hinterland south of Brussels have to incur the
additional costs of flying through a mainstream airport such as Brussels?
7b.. In another instance, a new joint terminal has been financed and developed by Lufthansa at Munich Airport.
However, such an arrangement might restrict access to airlines that are not in some form of alliance with
Lufthansa (Albers et aI, 2005) The authors also indicate that such investment in facilities has definite long-term
advantages for the airline, serving as a second hub to an near-capacity main base at Frankfurt and located
closer to the growth centers of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. But this leaves the airport dangerously
exposed if the airline suffers a downturn. Along with the airport the local suppliers, employees and the
community the Munich airport serves (ref Souty ,2005) might also be affected.
c.. Just such a problem arose in Sydney in 2001-02 when the bankruptcy of Ansett Airlines left their relatively
new purpose-built domestic terminal unused for over a year. In Ansetfs absence, two other new mar1<et
entrants (Virgin Blue and Impulse) were denied access to this empty terminal and had to use a temporary
terminal. Admittedly the issue was involved complex commercial and tenancy issues; there was also an attempt
to revive Ansett by the liquidators, which was unsuccessful and the terminal had to be then 'sold' along with the
rest of Ansett assets. Both these factors may have been the reason why other airlines were not allowed to use
this terminal. Nevertheless, Virgin Blue was aggrieved enough to wage a cheeky PR campaign against Sydney
Airport.
d. One can foresee similar issues arising with the new dedicated low-cost terminals that have just opened in
Changi airport Singapore and the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA). Both have enlisted the input and
commitment from only one of the Iow-cost airlines in the area - Tiger Airways and Air Asia respectively - before
their respective openings this year. At the time of writing, Phi6ppines' Cebu Air is the only other airline signed
up to use the Changi terminal; KLIA has not been able to attract Air Asia's competitors to use the terminal. Will
the other airlines be accorded the same level of access and user charges that the signing-on airlines have been
granted? Would these airlines be able-to adapt or alter the tangible and intangible elements of the respective
airports to suit their needs (keeping in mind that the signing-on airlines has significant input into the design of
the terminals) If not, would it force these low-cost airlines to pass on their higher on-ground costs to their
passengers and thereby reducing consumer surplus, and travel opportunities to some leisure destinations that
are solely served by low-cost carriers?
Interestingly both these low-cost terminals are parts of airports are corporatised airport entities that are not, in
the true sense, privatized. Are they then serving the broader consumer and community's (national?) interest if
their utilization is low? Admittedly both airports are still trying to sign on other low-cost airlines, thus far
unsuccessfully. Is it possible that the airports are, in some way, NOT offering the same terms as they did to the
8first-movers? Legally they may be entitled to do just this, but is it in other stakeholders' interests, to whom they
are, in fact indirectly accountable?
If the airline-airport nexus is not managed on sound ethical principles, the local community may argue that they
are dispossessed; as well, consumer welfare may not be addressed. Starkie (200S) argues for a participatory
approach with airlines. Gillen and Morrison (200S) suggest that aspects of the Canadian National Airport Policy
might be a worthwhile model to follow. This policy devolved airport management of 26 of Canada's largest
airports to municipality-controlled local airport authorities. The Federal government retained ownership of the
airports as well as setting up the regulatory framework. This terms of this latter framework was widened after
9/11, but, according Gillen et al (200S) rendered the Policy ineffective in encouraging the local airports to be
innovative, proactive in its development and generating 'profits' for the municipality / community. The authors
do believe, however, that such a structure of 'franchising' to local authorities has potential, especially if the
contract payments are levied on a per-passenger basis rather than a flat fee {which was what was done at
Charleroi).This way, there is a return to the community,-and the business cycle risk is also shared by both the
airport and the local community. Effectively this would also generate 'participation' by all stakeholders (through
the local municipality).
It must be remembered that airports constitute key infrastructure for a region - its industry as well as its
community. It is also, in most instances a key element in the tourism system, particular for a destination region.
They are also in a position to collect monopoly rents as the single airport in the region (as in Sydney and
Singapore). Unlike in Canada, however, many governments have taken a hands-off approach to the operations
of their airports, except with respect to safety and security issues. Airlines are the key customers, and the flag
carriers or major airlines of that country or region serve as anchor tenants to an airport. As such, it is quite
appropriate that special deals be negotiated. But without any input from other stakeholders (through institutions
.. .~. . .
like the local government) and with negotiations being treated as commercial-in-confidence, there is little scope
for participation in the strategic management of a key infrastructure resource.
2. Bilateral Air Service Agreements (ASAs) between two countries (not airlines) are negotiated by the
respective governments to determine the air traffic rights and passenger and cargo capacity between two
countries. They are negotiated for a fixed term. These capacities are then allocated amongst the one or more
designated flaq-camers of both countries usually on the basis of reciprocal access. The negotiations take time
to reach an outcome, sometimes lasting over a year and then the capacities are fixed for a certain period.
Therefore, ASAs inhibit the ability of airlines to respond promptly to passenger demand, but airlines also use
9these ASAs to protect their key (read profitable) routes. The continuing stoush over the trans-Atlantic routes
(between the USA, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the European Union, separately, on the other
hand) is a case in point. The USA is fiercely protec.ting incursions into the market share (and profitability} of its
financially vulnerable legacy airlines (most of whom fly across the Atlantic) . As the 'thickest' set of airline routes
in the world, between two avowed advocates of open markets, this situation contradicts even the narrow
confines of their professed free-market ideology.
The Pacific route between Australia and the USA is another example. Notwithstanding a free trade agreement
and a separate open-skies agreements between Australia and Singapore, Qantas lobbied hard to deny
Singapore Airlines' entry into this trans-Pacific route. The latter argues that just as Qantas can pick up traffic
from Singapore to fly to the UK and Europe, they should be allowed to pick up traffic from Australia to points
beyond - in this case the West Coast of the USA. There is a precedent for this. Currently Australia allows third
country airlines to fly passengers from Australia to New Zealand and vice versa. However, the Australia-US
route seems to be seen differently by the government. There are currently only two operators on the route
offering direct flights - the very successful Qantas and the weakened United Airlines which has just emerged
from bankruptcy. Qantas is said to derive 15% of its operating profit from this route. The Australian tourism
industry has also protested against the high revenue per seat-mile that Qantas enjoys on this route.
Latest press reports indicate more opposition to these government policies. Whilst the routes to North America
is the main trigger, industry leaders are now accusing the govemment of restricting expansion of all foreign
airline services into Australia (Sydney Morning Herald, 2006, eTN Asia Pacific, 2006). The CEOs of
Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane Airports (all of them privatized) and the CEO of a leading industry advocacy
group despair at the breakdown in bilateral aviation talks with Qatar, Vietnam, Taiwan and Singapore recently.
Apparently the government was tuming down these counties' request for increased access for their airlines
into Australia. The issue must be significant enough for these organisations to voice their concerns because in
doing so, they are indirectly pointing the finger at Qantas who is their 'anchor-tenant' (for the airports involved)
and a leading member of this advocacy group. The operators' concerns come against the background of
sluggish growth in tourist arrivals, culminating in a 1% drop in tourist arrivals into Australia in the March Quarter
2006. Separately, the Bureau of Transport Economics has reported a 1.4% drop in airline seats into Australia,
and there is a new (and well-known) US $150 million advertising campaign to lure more tourists to Australia.
The operators argue that air capacity is constraining any chance of reversing the decline in inbound tourism
flows.
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In both cases (trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific), there may well be some benefit for the shareholders and
employees of the airlines concerned, but the tourism industry suppliers (especially the airport operators) and
tourists at both ends of the route may not be well-served as a result of the double-standard being applied. The
AustraUan government spokesmen in these above 'reports stated that it was all a question of a 'Ieve~playing
field' and that the government subsidies allegedly being provided to Singapore Airlines and the Mddle Eastern
carriers disadvantage Qantas. This is disputed by 1I1eChief Executive of Emirates Airlines who points to "a UBS
Investment Research Report which said 1I1atit had found "little direct evidence of any subsidy and (1I1at1I1ey)
believe that the competitive strengths of the group can be explained by the underlying business model rather
than special treatmenf (Muqbail, 2006)
The very notion of a bilateral air service agreement implies 1I1ecreation of a duopoly, limiting supply and ports
of entry, and is 1I1erefore anti-eompetitive. The outcomes of1l1ese negotiations are also highly influenced by
strong lobbying of the governments (who in fact sign and negotiate the bilaterals) on both sides by interested
parties - the airlines in particular. Not even a purist version of dry economic ideology can justify 1I1e
.. '.. .
governmenfs and airline's stance. There seems to be simply one set of beneficiaries -1I1e airlines (and 1I1eir
employees and shareholders); the airports, the tourism industry in Australia and 1I1eoutbound Australian tourist
are not advantaged in any way.
3. Airline Alliances and Consolidation: It is also worthwhile to explore the rationale and scope of airline
alliances to determine whether 1I1eyconstitute unethical behaviour, or are they at worst anti-eompetitive. They
might also be providing benefits to olher stakeholders. Many of 1I1eanti-eompetitive business practices listed by
Souty (2005) could result from 1I1ecreation of an alliance.
In 1I1efirst place, an alliance between airlines takes many forms, and it is fair to say 1I1atno one has clearly
defined what constitutes an alliance and differentiated Urom some form of co-operative agreement on 1I1eone
hand, or a ' strategic alliance' or 'partnership' on the other. Therefore this discussion on alliances covers
everything from a simple code-sharing arrangement on one particular route between two airlines to broader
alliances encompassing each ofhers' entire network, to sharing resources and sources of supply to outright
equity-based linkages. There are also multi-airline alliances (like Star Alliance, oneworld and 1I1eSky Team
groupings).
The rationale behind airlines seeking alliances with their 'competitors' is three-fold. Firstly, it is not cost-effective
for an airline to straddle the globe operating its own routes, and yet there may be strategic imperatives where
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the airline would prefer to do so. This could occur when a key segment of customers demand a particular route,
which given their numbers and levels of usage would prove uneconomical for the airline to provide on its own.
But by allying with another airline (usually the flag carrier of the destination country, which in tum draws on its
own customer base as well), the routedoes become vi~.ble on a joint basis. Extending this fu~er, a strqng
alliance between two airlines could cover each other's entire networ1<,especially if there was good 'fif between
their respective routes without too much overlapping. In such a situation there may not be too many ethical
issues that become important. Indeed customer welfare is being catered for and there are increased tourism
flows. Neither is there any opposition to such arrangements on legal or ethical grounds (Travel and Tourism
Intelligence, 2000).
A second factor influencing alliance formation amongst airlines is the need for increased profitability. In the
airline industry, economies of scale bring lower unit costs only down to a certain point. Scale economies apply
on a single flight between an origin-destination pair. Once a flight is full, no further economies may be achieved,
so the airline seeks to increased frequencies on the same route. This creates a further set of economies called
networ1<economies or economies of density (Dogan is, 2002). But there comes a point when the mar1<eton that
route is fully catered for, and then an airline seeks to increase the number of routes that it serves, generating
economies of scope. This also ties in with the demand for the service as suggested in the previous paragraph.
Alliances can playa role in any of these stages in the search of economies; it is only when alliances tend to
shut out competition or new competitors from a route or landing slots in a congested airport, or if they indulge in
collusive pricing that the alliance behaviour is subject to review by competition authorities, where these exist.
Such an alliance on a particular route might become an effective duopoly. Especially if this was an international
route whose capacity etc were limited by International Air Service Agreements. In any event, such 'anti-
competitive behaviour'; might also be considered unethical, but they are being closely reviewed by competition
watchdogs in many countries.
The third reason for seeking (particula"ity multi-airline) alliance membership is are the promotional and branding
benefits that membership brings. Any promotion by Star Alliance, oneworld or Skyteam automatically carries
the names and logos of all member airlines. Such activity is not, in the least bit, controversial.
Mutli-airline alliances are primarily mar1<etingalliances thatfacilitates interlining between selected airlines in a
group for passengers to be ticketed and to travel on more than one airline, and to provide 'seamless travel'
Gundmundsson and Lechner (2006). Any attempt by airlines to join one of the major alliances mentioned above
is not seen as controversial; rather they are seen by many as crucial to provide traffic feed into their services
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from points that they cannot cost-effectively cover themselves. As the alliances grow in size and gain market
power, they could conceivably exert market power over airports to comer the best landing gates and slots. As
yet this is not a major issue, and hence not a cause for immediate concem here.
Outright ownership of another airline is at the extreme end of the continuum in terms of the intensity and 'scope
of collaboration between two airlines. Many airlines have minority holdings in other airlines, but foreign airlines
(even foreign non-airline investors) are prohibited from holding a majority stake in a particular country's airline
(be they the international f1ag-earrier or a domestic operator) . Europe has seen two mergers recently between
Air France and KLM on the one hand (France and Holland being EU member-states) and Lufthansa's take-over
of Swiss International (even though Switzerland is not a EU member). The deal had to be agreed to by
American regulatory authorities as well. But it is the EU that has taken the lead in allowing and regulating
alliances and mergers amongst European airlines, using a strong set of public-interest principles - particularly
with the airlines concerned having to relinquish some of their landing slots at their main bases - Paris,
Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Zurich respectively. This facilitates greater choice for consumers at these airports,
and allows 'new' carriers to land at these airports for the first time - perhaps from countries that have not had a
. .. . .
direct service to these key European destinations. Whilst there was some angst amongst the respective local
populations, it was balanced by the realization that such mergers were the only real protection against
bankruptcy / closure of the airlines in the crowded (and deregulated) European market Similarly, even the
government of China oversaw a period of consolidation of their publicly owned and private airlines into three
large groups, giving each of them sufficient economies of scale and density to be able to operate profitably, and
safely.
However, notable offenders include proponents of free- and liberalized markets - e.g. the governments of the
USA and Australia. They baulk at the idea of foreign ownership of 'their' airlines, with the USA specifying that
their airlines have to 75% locally owned on the grounds of national security. It may quite possibly be a public
interest issue for Australia, being an el1d-of-line de~tina~on; if Qantas did not exist a foreign-qwned airline may
not provide sufficient airline services at all times if there were better business opportunities elsewhere. There
is, of course, the issue of possible job losses, national pride, and their attendant electoral pull. This is probably
the reason behind New Zealand public's rejection of a proposed Qantas - Air New Zealand merger (Duval,
2005). Admittedly, neither airline islwas in any immediate danger of financial collapse Note that the NZ
authorities also rejected the merger in spite of the Single Aviation Market of Australia and New Zealand which is
very akin to the EU Aviation regime in its scope.
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The situation illustrates examples of market forces being compromised, even in loudly-proclaimed free and
liberalized markets. It is arguable whether public interest has been better served by denying the airlines the
merger. The EU example however shows how such alliances could be managed.
In summary, then alliances in most forms may tend to b-aanti~ompetitive (and they are therefore subject to
regulation), but they are in and of themselves not unethical and nor do they contravene the interests of any of
the stakeholder groups. If one argues that every country should have its own flaq-cerrier airline in its own
national interest, then any attempt and creating or allowing a foreign-owned f1ag~anier will compromise those
interests, particularly in a deregulated airline market, where there are supposedly baniers to exit. But, is as in
the case of the EU, a supra-national body safeguards individual coun1ries' interests, then even mergers and
takeovers (as a subset of alliances) need not be considered as being against the interests of all stakeholder
groups.
Souty, 2005, points out that the EC tends to be very proactive in discussing anti~ompetitive issues. But the
arguments posited still tend to be argued in economists' terms, and not in terms of broader social welfare. The
.. '.. . .
author implies that such arguments may be valid in developed coun1ries (and the scope of most EU rulings
tends to be in such jurisdictions). But when it comes to developing coun1ries, the force and impact of globalised
and large tourism companies creates a power imbalance. This is where such anti~ompetitive activity borders
on being not socially responsible or non-ethical. Smaller coun1ries (markets), weaker economies are the ones
who might suffer; further within these markets, it is the small and medium enterprise that bears the brunt rather
than the larger corporation that operates in many coun1ries (as Macbeth, 2005, implies).
Conclusion
This paper has explored three particular aspects of collaborative networks that are critical to airline strategy and
operations. There are a multitude of other issues end business practices that an airline might undertake .
individually that may be considered not socially responsible and/or unethical. They might include individual
instances of poor environmental manaqement, discriminatory human resource practices, misleading
advertising, predatory pricing etc. This paper, however, opted to focus on just their collaborative networks to
explore these aspects in some depth, even though only three broad aspects were chosen for discussion and
analysis. It is hoped that a preliminary set of principles might emerge that could then be tested against the full
range of airline operations and activities
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The preceding discussion reveals a few key points. Firstly, not all collaborative activities are necessarily anti-
competitive or unethical or not socially responsible. Most alliance formations are simply a matter of business
survival in the context of slowing growth, increased cost pressure and the implicit realization that air travel is
increasingly becoming a commodity product. It appears that even the traveling public has realized this
commoditisation since the advent of I~w-cost carriers. ~owever, the second key point is that ~s airlines and
airports become wholly privatized, the public interest dimension of their activities may appear to being lost
There may be a headlong rush to maximising retums to recoup their huge capital investments, but are the
publics ( the communities at both ends of the route) being disadvantaged? Such an outcome might eventuate
in the case of a monopoly operator (an airport or an airline) . The third key point is that national governments
are complicit in creating non-level playing fields and not adequately safeguarding public interests, and more
specifically, the interest of their tourism industry. They advocate more competition, greater choice, reducing
barriers to entry, open skies agreements and the like, but in the end they appear to succumb to narrowly
protectionist interests. Fourthly, the above discussion has highlighted all along the implications for the tourism
industry. A destination's targeted long-term growth (large or smalQ just may be caught in the crossfire here. Not
only are tourists' denied access to travel to chosen destinations, but business operators (large and small) and a
large number of tourism industry employees at the·destination would feel the effect
As such, a proposed set of guidelines or felos for the aviation industry and its key collaborators are:
• Sufficient, rather than maximum profitability, which benefits shareholders, their employees, and
suppliers and reinforces the firm's long-term sustainability ,
• Provision of safe, efficient and comfortable transport services, (This principle is currently being well-
served within the aviation industry),
• Governments' intervention in aviation matters to be dictated by its electoral mandate and defined set of
principles (derived from this mandate, rather than ideology), only safety and security is truly in the
'national interesf in a liberalized market,
• Provision of the critical link facilitating tourism flows between an origin and a destination, thereby
offering consumer choice at the origin, and enh-ancing tourism-specific economic activity and
employment at both ends.
"Business life is fundamentally co-operative" (Solomon, 1993: 356), but in the drive to satisfy shareholder
interests, the virtues of justice, integrity, competence and utility (Fleckenstein and Hubbard, 1999) are
sometimes overlooked. The overriding need for individual or organizational profit and growth leads to intense
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